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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROGER C. HIGGS, KURT MATHIA, 
and GEORGE C. MELIS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 17,607 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §67-17-6(5), of an administrative decision 
entered in an employee grievance proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant-appellees (grievants) initiated grievance 
proceedings against the plaintiff-appellant {Department) 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §67-17-6, and their grievances 
were heard according to the five-step procedure outlined there-
in. Part of the step-five decision rendered by Dr. A. J. Wann, 
State Hearing Officer, was adverse to the Department. The 
Department therefore filed a complaint with the Third Judicial 
District Court seeking judicial review of the administrative 
decision (R.2-4), and the grievants moved to dismiss on the 
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, since §67-19-25 (enacted after the step-five hearing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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had been scheduled) did not provide for an appeal by the 
Department from the step-five decision (R.12-21). The Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge, granted the grievants' motion 
(R. 36-36) . (A copy of the decision is attached hereto as 
Appendix "A".) The Department appeals from the dismissal of 
its complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks to have its complaint 
reinstated, permitting judicial review of the administrative 
decision. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Should a new statute be applied to proceedings commenced 
and nearly completed under the predecessor statute, where such 
would deprive the parties of any right of appeal? 
2. May a statute be applied retroactively where the 
legislature has not expressly so provided? 
3. Does the Constitutional right of appeal apply to 
proceedings held before an administrative tribunal? 
4. Did the express agreement of the parties have the effect 
of waiving the extra administrative step permitted under the new 
statute? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August and September of 1978, the defendants-respon-
dents lgrievants) initiated employee grievance proceedings 
against the plaintiff-appellant (Department) (R.41). The 
grievants objected to actions taken (including an investigation) 
by the Department in response to the grievants' offer to 
-2-
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provide consulting services to child support enforcement 
agencies in other states. The nature of the offered consulting 
work was very similar to the work the grievants had been 
employed to provide for the Department; the Department's 
investigation was designed to determine whether a conflict 
of interest existed. (R. 41, 48) 
When the grievants began the grievance procedures against 
the Department, Utah law provided for a five-step grievance 
procedure: (1) an oral discussion with the grievant's immedi-
ate supervisor; (2) a written appeal to the grievant's immedi-
ate supervisor; (3) a written appeal to the grievant's second-
level supervisor; (4) a written appeal to and hearing before 
the department head; and (5) a written appeal to and hearing 
before the state grievance hearing officer. Utah Code Ann. 
§67-17-6 (repealed 1979). These grievance procedures were 
available only to current state employees. Utah Code Ann. 
§67-17-5 (repealed 1979). Appeal of dismissal or termination 
could be made to the Merit Council. Utah Code Ann. §67-13-14 
(repealed 1979). 
Grievant Matthia completed Steps 1 through 4 of the grievance 
procedure (R.42). Grievants Higgs and Melis completed steps 
1 through 3, but their employment with the Department terminated 
before the Step 4 hearing was held. ~. 41). Higgs and Melis 
appealed their termination to the Merit Council, but subsequently 
dropped that appeal and request for reinstatement (R.43, ~ 
also R. 47). (The hearings appealed from, therefore, did 
not address the issue of whether the grievants should be 
-3-
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reinstated to their former positions; rather, at issue was 
the propriety of the steps taken to investigate the grievants' 
conduct.) All the grievants appealed to the State Hearing 
Officer for a Step 5 hearing. tR.42-44). 
At a prehearing conference held on April 24, 1979, before 
the newly-appointed State Hearing Officer, Dr. Wann, it was 
agreed by all present (including all the parties to this 
action) that the grievances of Higgs and Melis were to be 
referred back to the 4th level for a hearing, and that the 
hearing of Matthia tand also of Higgs and Melis if they 
chose to appeal the 4th level decision) would be heard by 
Dr. Wann on July 30 through August 3, 1979. (R. 43). 
"It was further agreed by all concerned that these cases 
should be heard through to their final resolution in accordance 
with the provisions of the then governing statute," Chapter 17 
of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, even though the parties were 
aware that the Legislature was considering a new management 
act, Senate Bill 179, which would, if enacted, become effective 
during the pendency of these proceedings. (R. 44) 
After the grievance process was four-fifths complete 
and after the Step 5 hearing had been scheduled, but before 
it was actually held, Senate Bill 179 was signed into law 
by the Governor, with an effective date of July 1, 1979. The 
new law, codified as Chapter 19 of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides for a six-step procedure for the resolution of grievances. 
Steps l through 5 are essentially the same as under the old 
law. However, the statute provided that only an employee, 
-4-
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and not an agency, could appeal from Step 5 to the new Step 
6. Step 6 provided for an appeal and hearing before a 
personnel review board created by the new law. The appeal 
apparently was to be based on the record from the Step 5 hearing 
and also on new evidence and testimony presented before the 
personnel review board. 
Grievants Higgs and Melis were not satisfied with the 
results at Step 4, and appealed to Step 5. On July 3, the 
Department obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking a restrain-
ing order ordering Higgs and Melis to show cause why they 
should not be restrained from proceeding with the Step 5 
hearing. One of the bases of the Order to Show Cause was 
that the new statute had eliminated the state hearing officer 
position held by Dr. Wann and that the new procedural pro-
visions were now in effect. (R. 44}. 
The Third District Court Judge David K. Winder denied 
the request for a restraining order (R.451, implicitly 
agreeing that the "old" law would continue to govern the 
proceedings. 
The Step 5 hearing was held as scheduled, with testimony 
being heard over a three-day period ~.46). Over four 
months later, Dr. Wann entered his decision, denying four 
and sustaining five of the nine grievances presented. (R.62). 
As authorized by Utah Code Ann. §67-17-6(5), the Department 
filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court appealing 
from the administrative decision rendered by Dr. Wann (R.2-4). 
-5-
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The Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, granted the 
grievants' Motion to Dismiss, stating that the Department 
had not exhausted all available administrative remedies as 
provided by the "new" statute lR. 36-37) . The Department properly 
perfected this appeal from the decision of the District Court 
(R. 65). 
Since the filing of this appeal, the Legislature has again 
changed the employee grievance laws. The new law, S.B. 271, 
signed by the Governor on March 20, 1981, although permitting 
an agency to appeal from Step 5 to Step 6, provides no avenue 
of appeal on either the law or the facts if the Step 6 decision 
is adverse to the agency. 
The 1981 law also changes Step 6 from a hearing in which 
evidence and testimony could be taken to one based wholly on 
the record from the Step 5 hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah has provided by statute that the repeal of any 
statute does not affect any proceeding commenced under the 
statute repealed, and that no statute is retroactive unless 
expressly so declared by the Legislature. This court has 
established that the law is to be fixed as of the conunencement 
of an action. Where procedural statutes have been applied to 
pending actions, it has been only to preserve a right of 
appeal, which this court has declared to be a valuable and 
constitutional right. Where application of a new procedural 
statute would deprive a party of the right to appeal, this 
court has held that such statutes do not apply to pending 
-6-
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actions. 
Judicial economy and efficiency require that the law not 
be changed during the pendency of an action. Foreseeing such 
a change, the parties to this action stipulated and agreed to 
conclude the proceedings according to the law in effect when 
they were commenced. That agreement should be honored by 
the courts. 
For the reasons stated, the order of the district court 
incorrectly applied the new statute to proceedings commenced 
and nearly completed under the old, and, therefore, the decision 
of the district court should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A NEW STATUTE WILL NOT APPLY TO PROCEEDINGS 
ALREADY COMMENCED IF SO DOING WILL LIMIT THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
Utah has provided by statute that "[t]he repeal of a 
statute does not • affect • • • any proceeding conunenced 
under or by virtue of the statute repealed." Utah Code 
Ann. §68-3-5 (1978). The rule is not limited to only those 
statutes that affect substantive rights--it speaks of any 
proceeding. It is a rule of construction that applies to 
all statutes in Utah. 
Case law supports this rule. In Archer v. Utah 
State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964), a case 
very similar to the one at bar, the plaintiff-appellant filed 
a complaint seeking judicial review of an action by the 
defendant-appellee Utah State Land Board. After the original 
-7-
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complaint was filed but before an amended complaint could be 
filed, the Legislature passed a bill providing for an adminis-
trative review of Land Board actions. The change was clearly 
procedural in nature. The defendant Land Board moved for 
dismissal on the grounds that the court now lacked jurisdiction, 
apparently alleging that the plaintiff had not exhausted the 
administrative remedies made available, by the new statute, 
after the proceeding was commenced. This Court reversed, 
stating that: 
This question can best be resolved by remarking 
that ordinarily the facts and the law in a given 
lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the 
filing of the original complaint. We see no 
good reason for departing from the basic rule in 
this case. 
392 P.2d at 624. 
Although the quote from Archer speaks of fixing the law as 
of the time of the original complaint, the same reasoning that 
led to that holding would also require that the law in the 
instant case be fixed as of the time the grievance proceedings 
were initiated. 
The courts have occasionally departed from this rule, 
but only if necessary to preserve a right of appeal. An 
example is Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 
(19091. In that case, the district judge made findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on March 16, 1907. Nine days later, 
on March 25, an amendment went into effect authorizing the 
judge to make additional findings of fact or conclusions of law 
after the entry of judgment. On June 8, the losing party 
-8-
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moved the court to make additional findings, and the court ook 
the motion under advisement. On September 21, 1907, the court 
finally entered additional findings of fact, but refused to 
enter additional conclusions of law. 
Meanwhile, more than six months lthe time for taking an 
appeal to the Supreme Court) had passed since the original 
entry of judgment. The losing party took its appeal, within 
six months of the second judgment, from the judge's refusal to 
enter additional conclusions of law. 
The appellee argued that the judge had no authority to 
enter additional findings, as the new statute was passed after 
judgment had been entered, and that therefore the appeal had 
not been timely made. 
The court, in order to preserve the appellant's right to 
appeal, allowed the new statute to apply, stating that: 
Every case must, to a considerable extent, 
depend on its own circumstances. General 
words in remedial statutes may be applied 
to past transactions and pending cases, 
according to all indications of legislative 
intent, and this may be greatly influenced 
by considerations of convenience, reasonable-
ness and justice. 
104 P. at 119-120 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
The Court concluded: 
(A]s such amendment pertained merely to a 
matter of procedure, we are clearly of the 
opinion that the amendment applied to this 
as well as to all the pending actions. 
Moreover, the right to an appeal is a consti-
tutional, as well as a valuable right and 
ought not to be denied except where it is 
clear the right does not exist, or has been 
lost or abandoned. The motion to dismiss 
-9-
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the appeal is therefore denied. 
104 P. at 120. 
Therefore, it appears that new laws will be applied to 
pending actions if necessary to preserve a right of appeal. 
However, the new law will not be applied if its application will 
serve to deny the right of appeal. 
This conclusion is born out in Industrial Commission v. Agee, 
56 Utah 63, 189 P. 414 (1920), where the Court declined to apply 
a new procedural statute to a pending action. 
In that case a widow applied to the Industrial Commission 
for compensation for the death of her husband. The Commission 
denied the claim, and the widow appealed (in September 1918) to 
the district court, as authorized by the statute then in force. 
The Commission's demurrer to the widow's complaint was sustained 
by the district court, and this court reversed and sent the 
case back. There were additional procedural maneuverings. 
During the pendency of the action, the Legislature passed an 
act providing that appeals from the Industrial Commission must 
be made to the Supreme Court within 30 days, and that no other 
court had jurisdiction to review Commission decisions. 
day time for appeal had long since passed.) 
(The 30-
The Industrial Commission petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of prohibition to stop the district judge (Agee) 
from proceeding to exercise jurisdiction, citing several 
cases (including Boucofski, supra) in support of the proposition 
that procedural statutes are to be applied to pending actions, 
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and that therefore the district court no longer had jurisdiction. 
The Court held that the new procedural statute did not 
apply to actions pending at its enactment, stating that: 
[T]he Constitution of the state of Utah 
guarantees every litigant the right of 
appeal .•. ; that to hold, under the cir-
cumstances, that the district court is 
without jurisdiction would in effect de-
prive the claimant of any legal remedy and 
nullify the express guaranty of our Consti-
tution of the right of the defendant to 
have her day in court. 
189 P. at 415. 
The Court explained that the Legislature, when it enacted 
the new statute, had in mind the predecessors of three statutes, 
Utah Code Ann. §§68-3-5, 68-3-21, and 68-3-3, which respective-
ly state that "[t]he repeal of a statute does not •• affect 
• • • any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue 
of the statute repealed," that statutes "are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes 
and to promote justice," and that "[no statute] is retroactive 
unless expressly so declared." The Court also considered 
the case of Boucofski, supra, where a procedural enactment 
had been applied to a pending action. 
The Court concluded that these authorities compelled 
the conclusion that, since to apply the new statute to pending 
actions would deprive the appellant of the right of appeal, 
the procedural provisions of the new statute should be applied 
only to future cases. 
In the instant case, the Department's only avenue of 
-11-
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appeal is to the District Court under the old law. Section 
67-19-25(6) provides that an appeal from a step-five hearing 
must be made within 10 working days following the receipt of 
the step-five decision. Dr. Wann entered his decision on 
January 15, 1980, and it was mailed to the parties on January 
28, 1981. The Department of Social Services, acting under the 
belief that the parties would honor their stipulation (that 
the "old" law would govern the proceedings), did not make any 
appeal to Step-six, but instead proceeded as authorized under 
Chapter 17. There, the new step-six hearing is not available 
to the Department, as the time for perfecting an appeal to the 
Personnel Review Board under the new statute has passed. 
If the Supreme Court were to now hold that the proceedings 
should henceforth be conducted in accordance with the new law, 
the Department will have no avenue of appeal. 
Therefore, in harmony with the above-cited cases, the new 
Chapter 19 of Title 67 should not be held to govern the 
grievance proceedings commenced and nearly completed before 
its effective date. Those grievance proceedings should be 
concluded, as they commenced, pursuant to the provisions of 
Chapter 17 of Title 67. 
POINT II 
THE NEW GRIEVANCE LAW IS SILENT AS TO ITS 
APPLICATION TO PENDING PROCEEDINGS, THEREFOffi 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW IS 
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. 
No express provision of Chapter 19, of Title 67 provides 
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that the procedure created therein shall have retroactive 
effect with respect to outstanding grievance procedures 
initiated prior to the effective date of that Chapter. The law 
of Utah is abundantly clear that absent express legislative 
mandate requiring retroactive application of newly enacted 
statutory provisions, such provisions will be deemed prospec-
tively applicable only. The Utah Code has so provided since 
1898: 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
lU.C.A. §68-3-3, emphasis added.) See also, Union Pacific 
Railroad Company v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah2d 101, 329 P.2d 398, 
399 (1958), footnote 11. 
The Utah Supreme Court has undeviatingly adhered to this 
proposition. In Union Pacific Railroad Company, ~· the 
Court noted: 
[A]s to any statutory question, Utah's policy 
demands the inclusion of an express authoriza-
tion to justify any restrospective application 
of a statute. ~-
Id., 329 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added). 
Thus, unless the particular enactment expressly provides 
for retroactive application, its operation and effect are 
deemed prospective only. In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 
148 P.2d 340, 341 (1944), ~ also, McCarrey v. Utah State 
Teachers' Retirement Board, 111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725, 726 
(_1947). 
Thus, because Chapter 19 of Title 67 contains no provision 
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whatsoever expressly mandating retroactive application of the 
substantive and procedural rights contained therein, under no 
conceivable circumstance could such provisions be deemed to 
operate retroactively. Furthermore, the grievance procedures 
initiated by these defendants were more than four-fifths 
complete as of the effective date of Chapter 19. The law is 
well-settled in Utah that the facts and law in a given lawsuit 
are to be applied as of the date of the initiation of the action. 
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, 
624 (1967) . 
In addition, if Chapter 19 is applied retroactively as 
required by the district court, it would operate to deprive 
the Department of a valuable vested right of appeal embodied 
in Chapter 17. See Utah Code Ann. §67-17-6(5). The general 
rules, univerally recognized, absolutely prohibits the retro-
active application of newly enacted statutory provisions when 
such would operate as a deprivation or other impairment of 
vested rights. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §349 (1974). This 
Court has already considered the issue of whether newly 
enacted statutory provisions, not expressly made retroactive. 
This Court has stated: 
But more important than any of the above is 
the oft proclaimed salutary principle: that 
ours is a government of laws and not of men. 
Accordingly, the law should not be changed 
simply because of the will or desire of judges 
as to what the law is or ought to be. Much 
less so, should it be so changed during-ule 
course of a particular proceeding to have a 
retroactive effect thereon. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the change the state advocates 
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would vindicate the position taken in the 
dissent referred to, to so rule in this 
case retroactively would violate what we 
regard as a higher principle: that of 
honoring the established law. If there is 
to be such a change in the law, whether by 
legislative act or by judicial decision, it 
seems that it should have only prospective 
effect and that fairness and good conscience 
require that it should not be applied retro-
actively to adversely affect rights as they 
existed at the time a particular controversy 
arose. 
State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 lUtah 1977, emphasis added). 
Having begun their grievances under Chapter 17, Title 67, 
the grievants are bound by the procedural provisions contained 
therein. Section 67-17-6(5) outlines the procedures to be 
followed during the course of and subsequent to the step-five 
administrative hearing. 
The section recognizes a statutory right of appeal from 
the decision of the step-five hearing officer, both in favor of 
the aggrieved employee and in favor of the State and its 
agencies. Pursuant to the authority of this section of the 
Code, the Department filed this action on June 13, 1980. The 
Department's complaint vested the district court with juris-
diction to consider the Department's appeal of the decision 
of the hearing officer at the step-five administrative hearing, 
and this Court should reverse the district court's dismissal 
of the Department's complaint. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS A STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF APPEAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
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[T]he right to an appeal is a constitutional, 
as well as a valuable right and ought not to 
be denied except where it is clear the right 
does not exist, or has been lost or abandoned. 
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 120 ll909). 
Therefore, any doubts the district court may have had regarding 
the Department's right to appeal the adverse administrative 
decision should have been resolved in favor of allowing the 
appeal. 
This right of appeal was reaffirmed in the recent case 
of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
The plaintiff•s business license had been revoked, and she 
protested in various proceedings, including an administrative 
hearing before the defendant Commission at which the plaintiff 
was represented by counsel. The plaintiff petitioned the 
district court for a trial de novo, rather than for a review of 
the record as was done in the instant case. This court, although 
denying the trial de novo the plaintiff requested, did hold 
that the plaintiff had a right to have a court review the 
record. The court stated: 
[W]e are in accord with the proposition that 
a party who deems himself to be wronged by 
unlawful or capricious and arbitrary action 
of a public official or department of govern-
ment does and should have a right of access 
to the courts to review and test the validity 
of his contention. 
555 P.2d at 283. 
The court explained that this right of review is imple-
mented through the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 7, 
which provides: that "[t]he District Court shall have ... 
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appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the same ... " 
The fact that the plaintiff-appellant at bar is a 
governmental entity rather than a natural person should not 
affect its right to a review of a decision rendered by another 
governmental entity. The court in Peatross stated that a 
"party" had a right of access to the courts to seek review of 
the administrative decision. The rules of construction for 
the Utah statutes provide that "[t]he word 'person' includes 
bodies politic .•• "Utah Code Ann. §68-3-12(5) (1978). These 
authorities indicate that it is the policy of this state that 
political entities have the same rights as natural persons. 
When the grievants commenced their proceedings against the 
Department, Utah law provided that both parties had the right to 
seek review in the courts of the decision rendered by the admin-
istrative tribunals. The Utah Constitution explicitly provides 
that the district court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
inferior tribunals. It was error for the district court to hold 
that the new grievance law, enacted when these proceedings were 
nearly complete, deprived the court of its constitutionally-
conferred jurisdiction to review Dr. Wann's decision. The order 
dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint should therefore 
be reversed. 
POINT IV 
BY EXPRESS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES WAIVED 
THE ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL STEPS UNDER THE 
NEW GRIEVANCE LAW. 
Both the old (Utah Code Ann. §67-17-41 and the new (Utah 
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Code Ann. §67-19-23) grievance laws provide that the parties 
may, by mutual agreement, waive any of the steps of the 
grievance procedure. To prevent fraud, the statute requires 
that the waiver be evidenced by a writing. This requirement 
is met by the signed decision of Dr. Wann which states that 
"[I]t was further agreed by all concerned that these cases 
should be heard through to their final resolution in accordance 
with the provisions of the then governing statute (R.44). 
It is a general rule that, although parties may not stipu-
late as to points of law or to invest a court with jurisdiction 
which it would not otherwise have, parties may stipulate to 
matters "relating merely to the conduct of a pending proceeding." 
73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations §4 (19741, First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C. N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 
(Utah 1979). The courts are ordinarily bound by those 
stipulations. 600 P.2d at 527. 
It was established in the previous argument that the 
Utah Constitution confers jurisdiction on the district courts 
to review the decisions of all inferior tribunals. Utah Const. 
Art. VIII §7. The law under which these proceedings were had 
specifically allowed the parties to waive any additional appeal 
steps that might exist (Utah Code Ann. §67-17-4), and in any 
event, such a stipulation could not be considered a matter of 
law, but rather simply a matter "relating merely to the conduct 
of a pending proceeding." Therefore, the stipulation of the 
parties did not in anyway encroach upon the domain of the 
court, and it should have been honored. 
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To deny effect to the stipulation would also work a great 
injustice upon the Department. In reliance on the express 
agreement of the parties that the proceedings would continue 
to be held according to Chapter 17, the Department looked to 
that statute to determine its right of appeal and the procedux-e 
for taking such appeal. Since the time for taking an appeal 
under the new Chapter 19 has now passed, a failure to honor the 
stipulation of the parties would serve to deny the Department 
of even the minimal right of appeal granted by Chapter 19, 
and would leave them caught between two laws with absolutely 
no remedy. The decision of the district court denying effect 
to the stipulation was therefore error, and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The law concerning employee grievance proceedings against 
the State is apparently in a state of flux. Since the 
grievants initiated their complaints against the Department 
in 1978, the law has been changed twice. The first change 
added an extra step to the hearing process. The second 
change changed the nature of that extra step. In reliance on 
a stipulation of the parties, the Department determined its 
right of appeal from the original law. It is at best uncertain 
whether they can now return and attempt to file an appeal, 
over a year late, under the new law. It is also uncertain 
whether, if such an appeal were taken, the step-six hearing 
would be conducted as provided at the time the grievants 
perfected their appeal from the step-five decision (a hearing 
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based on the record and on new testimony and evidence) or 
whether the 1981 change in the law would apply (a hearing 
based solely on the record) . 
No proceeding can be efficiently conducted if the law 
under which it is held is so frequently changed. The Legislature 
has recognized this, and specifically provided that a repeal 
of a statute does not affect any proceeding commenced under the 
statute repealed. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-5 ll978). This court 
has stated that laws should not be changed during the course of 
a particular proceeding. State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 
(Utah 1977). This rule is especially important where the 
valuable and constitutional right of appeal is at stake. 
For the reasons above stated, the parties are in need of 
guidance from this Court concerning which law should apply to 
these proceedings. This Court should hold that these proceedings 
may be completed as they commenced pursuant to Chapter 17 of 
Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, and that therefore the order 
of the district court dismissing the Department's complaint 
should be reversed and the complaint reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted this 2~~4 day of June, 1981. 
--?/? ~ ~ ... DON R. PETER~~for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant to Ms. Kathryn Collard, Attorney for Defendants-
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Respondents, 417 Church Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
this 0'76f....?aay of June, 1981. 
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